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2 
Introduction 
A nascent competitor is a firm whose prospective innovation 
represents a serious future threat to an incumbent. The firm’s potency as a 
competitor is as yet not fully developed and hence unproven. For example, 
a new, fast-growing, and evolving online platform is a nascent competitor 
to the currently dominant platform. A promising but unproven cure for a 
disease represents nascent competition for an incumbent selling a therapy 
that is the current standard of care.  
Nascent rivals play an important role in both the competitive 
process and the process of innovation.1 New firms with new technologies 
can challenge and even displace existing firms; sometimes, innovation by 
an unproven outsider may be the only way to provide new competition to 
an entrenched incumbent. That makes the treatment of nascent 
competitors core to the goals of the antitrust law. As the D.C. Circuit has 
explained, “it would be inimical to the purpose of the Sherman Act to 
allow monopolists free rei[n] to squash nascent, albeit unproven, 
competitors at will . . . .”2 
 Government enforcers have expressed interest in protecting 
nascent competition, particularly in the context of acquisitions made by 
leading online platforms. 3  However, enforcers face a dilemma. While 
nascent competitors often pose a uniquely potent threat to an entrenched 
incumbent, the firm’s eventual significance is uncertain, given the 
environment of rapid technological change in which such threats tend to 
arise. That uncertainty, along with a lack of present, direct competition, 
may make enforcers and courts hesitant or unwilling to prevent an 
incumbent from acquiring or excluding a nascent threat. A hesitant 
enforcer might insist on strong proof that the competitor, if left alone, 
 
1 See infra Part I.B. 
2 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per 
curiam). 
3 See, e.g., D. Bruce Hoffman, Dir., Bureau of Comp., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks 
at GCR Live Antitrust in the Digital Economy: A Snapshot of Federal Trade Commission 
Issues (May 22, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/ 
1522327/hoffman_-_gcr_live_san_francisco_2019_speech_5-22-19.pdf; Jeffrey M. 
Wilder, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice, 
Remarks as Prepared for the Hal White Antirust Conference: Potential Competition in 
Platform Markets (June 10, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1176236/ 
download; Terrell McSweeny & Brian O’Dea, Data, Innovation, and Potential 
Competition in Digital Markets—Looking Beyond Short-Term Price Effects in Merger 
Analysis, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, Feb. 2018, at 5–6. 
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probably would have grown into a full-fledged rival, yet in so doing, 
neglect an important category of anticompetitive behavior. 
In this Essay, we identify nascent competition as a distinct 
analytical category and outline a program of antitrust enforcement to 
protect it. Nascent competition means different things to different people. 
Our approach emphasizes prospective innovation by a future direct 
competitor. We consider both exclusionary conduct and acquisitions, with 
a particular focus on the latter. We confine ourselves to liability and 
bracket questions of remedy. 
We favor an enforcement policy that prohibits anticompetitive 
conduct that is reasonably capable of contributing significantly to the 
maintenance of the incumbent’s market power.4 That approach implies 
enforcement even where the competitive significance of the nascent 
competitor is uncertain. Uncertainty is a ground for caution, but we argue 
that the overall balance favors a bias to action, given the importance of the 
innovation at issue and resulting costs of underenforcement. As this 
suggests, the proper approach does not require proving, as some have 
argued, that successful competitive entry in the “but-for” world by the 
excluded innovator would necessarily or probably have occurred. Such a 
stringent standard would allow too much leeway for the elimination of 
nascent threats and even produce a perverse incentive for threatened 
incumbents to accelerate their anticompetitive actions.5 
The acquisition of a nascent competitor raises several particularly 
challenging questions of policy and doctrine. First, acquisition can serve 
as an important exit for investors in a small company, and thereby attract 
capital necessary for innovation. Blocking or deterring too many 
acquisitions would be undesirable. However, the significance of this 
concern should not be exaggerated, for our proposed approach is very far 
from a general ban on the acquisition of unproven companies. We would 
discourage, at most, acquisition by the firm or firms most threatened by a 
nascent rival. Profitable acquisitions by others would be left alone, as 
would the acquisition of complementary or other nonthreatening firms. 
While wary of the potential for overenforcement, we believe that scrutiny 
of the most troubling acquisitions of unproven firms must be a key 
ingredient of an innovation policy. 
 
4 See infra Part II.A. 
5 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79 (describing a monopolist’s incentive, if a different 
and more stringent standard were employed, “to take more and earlier anticompetitive 
action”). 
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4 
Second, as a matter of enforcement practice, the question of how 
to distinguish harmful from harmless acquisitions is important and 
sometimes difficult. Many acquisitions have important procompetitive 
justifications or are harmless overall. A small, unproven firm might be 
acquired by a dominant firm in order to acquire expertise, to add a specific 
technical capability, or to make a bet on a “moon shot”—a risky, unproven 
technology in an unrelated market. Distinguishing anticompetitive 
conduct is a familiar and pervasive problem in antitrust enforcement, but 
it is heightened by the uncertainties associated with innovation and 
technological change. 
We think evidence of an anticompetitive plan is a particularly 
important guide in this area.6 Such intent might be subjectively expressed 
through testimony or internal writings—essentially borrowing the parties’ 
expertise to help form a judgment about competitive effects. Alternatively, 
intent might be revealed through conduct, such as paying too much for a 
rival (unless the anticompetitive benefits are taken into account) or a 
broader pattern of buying nascent competitors. 
Third, uncertainty and product evolution also influence the timing 
of antitrust intervention, whether for exclusionary conduct or 
acquisitions. 7  Where nascent competitors are concerned, agencies can 
intervene early—before an acquisition closes or, in an exclusion case, 
when evidence of exclusion first surfaces. Given the inherent 
informational limits when it comes to nascent competitors, it can 
sometimes be better to wait.8 At a minimum, the passage of time should 
not be disqualifying.  
While waiting may sometimes make a remedy more disruptive, it 
can also permit regulators to acquire critical information that is 
unavailable at an earlier period. Regulators can learn about the true intent 
of the conduct, as hidden information comes to light or (more prosaically) 
as multiple bad acts by the dominant firm gradually fill in an overall 
picture. Moreover, they can learn about the adverse effect of the conduct, 
including the plausible potency of the nascent competitor and the durable 
market power of the incumbent. Making use of such new information does 
not indulge in unwarranted hindsight bias. This conclusion contrasts with 
 
6 See infra Part III.A. 
7 Cf. Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement if Innovation 
Mattered Most, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 325–28 (2012) (describing timing of intervention 
as a key matter). 
8 See infra Part III.B. 
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5 
recent proposals emphasizing the need for new ex ante regulation rather 
than stronger ex post enforcement.9 
 This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I defines what we mean by 
nascent competitors and provides paradigmatic examples. Part II sets out 
and defends our overall approach to protecting nascent competition and 
analyzes its fit with existing antitrust law. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 
which prohibits certain anticompetitive acquisitions, is a particularly 
useful tool where the nascent competitor already has a presence in the 
incumbent’s market. We argue that Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also 
an effective enforcement tool in the context of incumbents with monopoly 
power. Here, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Microsoft 
provides a helpful framework. Part III assesses several types of evidence 
that are particularly important components of an antitrust enforcement 
program aimed at protecting nascent competition from anticompetitive 
acquisitions. 
I. What Is a Nascent Competitor? 
As we use the term, a nascent competitor is a firm whose 
innovation represents a serious, albeit not completely certain, future threat 
to an incumbent. We begin by presenting several real-world examples of 
nascent competition, then turn to an explication of the key features of our 
definition.  
A. Examples 
Operating systems for personal computers. In the 1990s, Microsoft 
identified an emergent threat to its Windows operating system monopoly. 
The rise of Netscape’s Internet browser was central to a paradigm shift 
that threatened Microsoft’s dominance. This threat was amplified by Sun’s 
 
9 See, e.g., HM TREASURY, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION: REPORT OF THE 
DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL 2 (Mar. 13, 2019), https://assets.publishing. 
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unloc
king_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/59LL-9VAR] 
[hereinafter FURMAN REPORT] (suggesting that, in the context of the digital economy, a 
more forward-looking approach with clearer ex ante rules is needed); GEORGE J. STIGLER 
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. AND THE STATE, UNIV. OF CHI. BOOTH SCH. OF BUS., 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE 89–92 (2019), https://research. 
chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/market-structure-report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/GQ8E-MWKZ] (proposing the creation of a new Digital Authority with ex ante 
regulatory authority including merger review). 
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development of the Java programming language and Intel-developed 
hardware that was designed for use with Java. Microsoft CEO Bill Gates 
catalogued these threats in internal communications, most famously the 
“Internet Tidal Wave” memo that ultimately provided a road map to the 
antitrust case against the firm.10 
Netscape and Sun posed a nascent competitive threat. Neither were 
plausibly, at the time, substitutes. Netscape’s offering did not compete 
with Windows.11 However, Microsoft feared that over time they would 
evolve into substitutes,12 and acted to neutralize the competitive threat. 
DNA sequencing. Illumina is the leading manufacturer of 
instruments that identify the order of nucleotides in a DNA sample, with 
a market share of 80 percent or more.13 A second firm, PacBio, also makes 
sequencing equipment. PacBio uses a “long read” technology in contrast 
to Illumina’s “short read” technology. 14  Historically, long read 
sequencing has been less cost-effective on a cost per genome basis than 
short read, but over time, the cost and throughput of long read technology 
has improved.15 By 2018, according to the FTC, PacBio had become an 
increasing threat to Illumina’s monopoly, with the expectation of further 
 
10 Memorandum from Bill Gates, Chairman and CEO of Microsoft Corp., to Exec. 
Staff and Direct Reports, Microsoft Corp. (May 26, 1995), https://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/atr/legacy/2006/03/03/20.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8CX-ZDFQ]. 
11 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53–54 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) 
(per curiam) (assessing the perceived threat to Microsoft posed by Netscape’s browser). 
12 See id. at 54 (describing “middleware technologies that threatened to become 
viable substitutes for Windows”). 
13 See Maxx Chatsko, What Happens Next for Illumina and Pacific Biosciences?, 
MOTLEY FOOL (Dec. 28, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/12/28/ 
what-happens-next-for-illumina-and-pacific-bioscie.aspx (“Illumina boasts an 80% 
market share of the global next generation sequencing (NGS) market, making it the 
undisputed king of reading genomes.”); see also Complaint at 6, Illumina, Inc., No. 9387 
(F.T.C. filed Dec. 17, 2019) [hereinafter Illumina Complaint] (alleging market share 
greater than 90%). 
14  See David McLaughlin & Kristen V. Brown, U.S. Moves to Block DNA-
Sequencing Deal on Competition Fears, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2019, 4:08 PM), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-17/u-s-moves-to-block-dna-sequencing-
merger-on-competition-fears [https://perma.cc/93LG-YZX5] (describing the two 
technologies). 
15 See Shanika L. Amarasinghe et al., Opportunities and Challenges in Long-Read 
Sequencing Data Analysis, 21 GENOME BIOLOGY (2020), https://genomebiology. 
biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13059-020-1935-5 [https://perma.cc/DS8H-YUV9 
] (describing this trend). 
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convergence to come.16 Thus, PacBio posed a nascent threat to Illumina, 
which Illumina sought to eliminate by acquiring PacBio. 
Social network services. In 2014, Facebook was the world’s 
leading social network provider.17 The firm, like Microsoft twenty years 
before, carefully scanned the horizon for nascent threats that might 
displace it. 18  Facebook executives regarded messaging apps as “the 
biggest competitive threat we face as a business.” 19  CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg wrote colleagues, in an echo of the Tidal Wave memo, that 
messaging apps “are trying to build social networks and replace us.”20 
WhatsApp, a leading messaging app, was a particular focus of these 
concerns. One senior executive wrote that “WhatsApp launching a 
competing platform is definitely something I’m super-paranoid about.”21 
WhatsApp posed a nascent competitive threat. In 2014, it was not 
a fully fledged social network. The competitive concern was that 
WhatsApp might “morph into Facebook” over time.22 In 2014, Facebook 
acquired WhatsApp for $22 billion, thereby eliminating the competitive 
threat.23 A similar dynamic was reportedly at play in Facebook’s 2012 
acquisition of Instagram, a fast-growing photo sharing app that Facebook 
apparently regarded as a serious threat.24 
 
16 Illumina Complaint, supra note 13, at 7. 
17 See, e.g., Alexis Madrigal, The Fall of Facebook, ATLANTIC, Dec. 2014, https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/12/the-fall-of-facebook/382247 [https:// 
perma.cc/725F-KDPS] (“A decade after Facebook emerged from the Ivy League dorms 
in which it started, it is the most powerful information gatekeeper the world has ever 
known.”); Katie Holliday, A World Without Facebook: Will It Happen?, CNBC, Apr. 15, 
2014, https://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/14/a-world-without-facebook-will-it-happen.html 
[https://perma.cc/MMQ9-3PC9] (“[T]he sheer power and dominance of the social 
networking site is strikingly clear.”). 
18 See Sam Schechner & Parmy Olson, Facebook Feared WhatsApp Threat Ahead 
of 2014 Purchase, Documents Show, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 6, 2019, 6:37 PM), https://www. 
wsj.com/articles/facebook-feared-whatsapp-threat-ahead-of-2014-purchase-documents-
show-11573075742 [https://perma.cc/5YTG-SGLG] (describing competitive 
surveillance of WhatsApp and other nascent competitors). 
19 Id. (quoting Javier Olivan, Facebook’s head of growth). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. (quoting Mike Vernal, a senior Facebook executive). 
22 Id. (quoting Olivan). 
23 Id. (noting completion of transaction in October 2014 for approximately $22 
billion). 
24 See Josh Kosman, Facebook Boasted of Buying Instagram to Kill the Competition: 
Sources, N.Y. POST (Feb. 26, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/02/26/facebook-boasted-
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B. Significance and Definition  
Our definition of nascent competition has three components, 
drawn from the facts and reasoning of Microsoft. There, the court’s 
understanding that Netscape was a “nascent . . . competitor” had three 
important features: [1] that the Netscape browser held promise as the 
foundation of an innovative new software development platform; [2] that 
the potential of Netscape’s innovation had not fully come to fruition but 
might do so in the future; and [3] that this prospect posed a serious threat 
to Windows. 
Innovation. First, a nascent competitor is an innovator. Innovation 
can take the form of technical progress or new business models that better 
serve consumer needs. Protecting the fruits of innovation is important 
because new products and services drive economic growth. Such 
competition is valuable both because the entrant’s product may represent 
a real advance and because the entrant increases the competitive pressure 
on the incumbent to innovate in anticipation or response.25 
Over the last century and a half, small, innovative firms have 
played a particularly important role in the process of innovation and 
competition. This is not to discount the important history of innovation at 
big firms with large research laboratories, such as Bell Labs, Xerox 
PARC, and research labs at General Electric and Merck, among others.26 
However, over the same period, it cannot be denied that a significant 
number of disruptive innovations—those that transform industry—have 
come out of very small firms with new technologies unproven at the time: 
 
of-buying-instagram-to-kill-the-competition-sources [https://perma.cc/E4QG-Y3S9] 
(reporting the contents of a Facebook document uncovered during FTC review of the 
transaction). 
25  Cf. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N., HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 6.4 (2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], https://www. 
justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 [https://perma.cc/CQ5M-8PDD] 
(describing, as possible effects from a horizontal merger, a “reduced incentive to continue 
with an existing product-development effort or . . . to initiate development of new 
products”). 
26 See, e.g., JON GERTNER, THE IDEA FACTORY: BELL LABS AND THE GREAT AGE OF 
AMERICAN INNOVATION (2013); MICHAEL A. HILTZIK, DEALERS OF LIGHTNING: XEROX 
PARC AND THE DAWN OF THE COMPUTER AGE (2003); FRAN HAWTHORNE, THE MERCK 
DRUGGERNAUT: THE INSIDE STORY OF A PHARMACEUTICAL GIANT (2005). 
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9 
examples include the Bell Telephone Company, RCA, MCI, Genentech, 
Apple, Netscape, and dozens of others.27 
There is a particular competitive significance of the big 
innovations at the smaller firms, for they also represent competitive entry, 
and sometimes completely transform the industry. 28  As for the later, 
consider that Bell’s telephone did not improve the telegraph, but replaced 
it, or the impact of Apple’s personal computer on the computing industry. 
As this suggests, nascent competitors can hold the promise of offering 
fresh competition for the market, not just in the market. They have the 
capacity to displace an incumbent through a paradigm shift—for example, 
a new platform for developing software or decoding a genome. Nascent 
competition tends to be important in industries marked by rapid innovation 
and technological change. Software, pharmaceuticals, mobile telephony, 
e-commerce, search, and social network services are leading examples. 
Future potency. Second, a nascent competitor is relevant due to its 
promise of future innovation. Its potency is not yet fully developed and 
hence unproven. Whether that innovation will make a difference in the 
marketplace is subject to significant uncertainty. That is due to the 
unpredictable rate and direction of technological change. This uncertainty, 
in other words, stems from the same forces of technological progress that 
make innovation so valuable. The nascent competitor may fail in various 
ways: the unproven cure, despite highest hopes, may flunk its clinical 
trials; the technologies thought to be the future might, in fact, be overrated. 
This uncertainty may not be a quantifiable risk, like the odds in a casino, 
but closer to Knightian true uncertainty—in other words, not readily 
susceptible to measurement.29 
The unpredictable path of innovation often results in product 
plasticity, in which products evolve and are used for purposes different 
than the original. For example, in the 1990s, mobile telephones were 
introduced as a complement to a wired telephone, as a means for making 
 
27 Small and large firms have different advantages and disadvantages when it comes 
to innovation: the relevant point here is that both have been, over history, important 
contributors. See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION 
EMPIRES 19–20 (2010). 
28 See id. at 18–22, 159. 
29  FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 232–33 (1957) (“The 
practical difference between . . . risk and uncertainty . . . is that in the former, the 
distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known . . . .” By contrast, “true 
uncertainty” is “not susceptible to measurement . . . .”). 
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calls on the go. 30  Today, they compete with land lines, cameras, 
computers, televisions, and credit cards. General purpose technologies 
such as computing and Internet connectivity act as powerful fuel for 
unpredictable change.31 Uncertainty about what products the incumbent 
and the nascent competitor will actually offer in the future has a further 
consequence—uncertainty about the degree to which those products will 
actually compete. 
In some cases, a nascent competitor may already have begun to 
compete in the incumbent’s market, even if its potency is not yet fully 
proven. For example, at the time of its announced acquisition, PacBio 
competed with Illumina for sequencing business, and WhatsApp 
competed with Facebook for user attention. Existing competition, where 
it exists, may be merely partial: the Netscape browser competed with 
Microsoft’s browser but not (yet) with Windows. 
Where competition has already begun, its existence might inform 
a positive prediction about future competition. In addition, a particular 
acquisition might be challenged on account of lost current competition. 
However, current competition is not an essential feature of nascent 
competition. It is the further, future developments that give nascent 
competition its distinctive importance.32 
 
30 Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to 
Commercial Mobile Services, WT Docket No. 02-379, Notice of Inquiry, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. 
24923, 24940 (Dec. 11, 2002) (“Historically, most consumers used their mobile phones 
as a mobile complement to their wireline phones by using their mobile handsets only 
when away from their homes or places of work.”). 
31 See generally Timothy F. Bresnahan & Manuel Trajtenberg, General Purpose 
Technologies: “Engines of Growth”?, 65 J. ECONOMETRICS 83 (1995). 
32 Our definition matches the usage of the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft, which viewed 
Netscape as a nascent competitor even though Netscape did not offer current competition 
to Windows. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) 
(per curiam); see also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 
(1940) (“It is the ‘contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce’ which § 1 of the Act strikes down, whether the concerted activity be wholly 
nascent or abortive on the one hand, or successful, on the other.”). An alternative 
definition requires some degree of current competition. See, e.g., Paul T. Denis, Partner, 
Dechert LLP, Address at the Fed. Trade Comm’n Hearing on Competition and Consumer 
Protection in the 21st Century: Nascent Competition: Is the Current Analytical 
Framework Sufficient?, at 187 (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/public_events/1413712/ftc_hearings_session_3_transcript_day_3_10-17-
18_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YNJ-X29E] (acknowledging “common usage [of] the 
term . . . to refer to competition that we’ve yet to see” but criticizing this definition as 
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Threat to the incumbent. Finally, a nascent competitor poses a 
serious threat to the incumbent. The owner of a tech platform, focused on 
holding on to its position, may continually scan the horizon for dangerous 
new technologies or fast-growing firms that might evolve into competitive 
threats. Microsoft in the 1990s and Facebook in the 2010s are good 
examples of firms that were highly concerned with their own 
displacement. 
The prospect of disruptive competition for the market raises the 
stakes, intensifying an incumbent’s attentiveness to the risk of being 
usurped. Some incumbents are particularly aware of this possibility, 
having been the beneficiary of such a paradigm shift at an earlier time: 
consider that Microsoft, for example, replaced the CP/M operating system 
when computing moved from microcomputers to personal computers, and 
that Facebook replaced MySpace.33 Not every technology that poses a 
future threat is perfectly obvious on its face. A technology might stay 
complementary in one firm’s hands, but in the hands of another, provide 
a foothold for evolution into a substitute.  
*      *      * 
Our definition of nascent competition is restrictive in certain 
respects. It leaves out future competition where innovation plays no major 
role 34  or is uncertain for reasons other than the rate and direction of 
technological change.35 Such cases might concern “nascent competition” 
in a broad sense and merit protection from antitrust law, depending on the 
facts. Our definition also excludes firms producing complements that, 
absent exclusion or acquisition by the incumbent, might facilitate third-
 
“incorrect” because “[t]he word itself implies some degree of competition that’s present 
but . . . not yet fully realized”); see also Competition in Digital Technology Markets: 
Examining Acquisitions of Nascent or Potential Competitors by Digital Platforms: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 2 (2019) (statement of John M. Yun, 
Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/ 
doc/Yun%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/46JG-J5PJ] (adopting and paraphrasing 
Denis’s view). 
33 Had MySpace in its heyday acquired or excluded Facebook, such conduct would 
have warranted examination under the principles outlined in this paper. 
34 We discuss other forms of lost future competition infra Part II.B. 
35 See, e.g., Complaint at 11–12, FTC v. Mallinckrodt ARD Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00120 
(D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/ 
170118mallinckrodt_complaint_public.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG65-KUA5] (alleging 
that a U.S. drug maker violated antitrust law by acquiring a low-priced, chemically 
similar treatment for same condition, approved in Europe but not the United States). 
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party competition. 36  We limit ourselves here to focus on a subset of 
important cases that present distinctive opportunities and challenges for 
antitrust enforcement. 
II. Protecting Nascent Competition 
A. Overall Approach 
We favor an enforcement policy that prohibits anticompetitive 
conduct that is reasonably capable of contributing significantly to the 
maintenance of the incumbent’s market power. That approach, which is 
drawn from Microsoft, 37  implies a particular decision rule. Where an 
incumbent (1) eliminates or impedes a nascent competitor through 
acquisition or exclusion, (2) that poses the requisite level of competitive 
threat, and (3) without fully offsetting competitive benefits, such conduct 
should be prohibited. Several features of our approach bear particular note. 
Uncertain threats. Notably, the proposed approach does not 
require proving that successful competitive entry, in the but-for world, 
would necessarily have occurred. Our approach would protect competition 
even if the but-for world cannot be specified with confidence or 
exactitude, and even if such entry cannot be shown to be more likely than 
not. 
Searching scrutiny is justified by the importance of protecting 
innovation by entrants. Protecting innovation is properly regarded as a 
central goal of antitrust enforcement.38 And new, unproven innovators are 
 
36 See, e.g., Kevin Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and 
Antitrust Policy, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10–11), https://ssrn. 
com/abstract=3376966 (focusing on this issue); Mark A. Lemley & Andrew McCreary, 
Exit Strategy 19 (Stan. L. & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 542, 2020), https://ssrn. 
com/abstract=3506919 [https://perma.cc/Y8EZ-F8LX] (emphasizing Instagram’s 
platform agnosticism, which facilitated competition with Facebook by Twitter and 
others); Thomas Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 99 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 14–16) (discussing this issue in the context of “adversarial 
interoperability”). 
37 See infra Part II.C (discussing Microsoft in more detail). 
38 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Innovation: Where We Are and Where We 
Should Be Going, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 749, 751 (2011) (“[T]here seems to be broad 
consensus that the gains to be had from innovation are larger than the gains from simple 
production and trading under constant technology.”). 
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a key source of disruptive innovation. 39  Displacement often brings 
multiple benefits to consumers, including an improved product, a new 
distribution of surplus between producers and customers, and an openness 
to further entry in this and adjacent businesses. Given the incentive and 
ability of incumbents to destroy or coopt innovative threats, avoiding that 
outcome is an important target for enforcement. The risk of lost innovation 
strongly tips the balance in favor of a bias to action.  
We therefore disagree with suggestions that an enforcer, to 
establish antitrust liability, should be asked to prove that competition in 
the but-for world is more likely than not.40 Such a suggestion is sometimes 
improperly conflated with the distinct requirement to prove a plaintiff’s 
case by a preponderance of the evidence. The implication is that, when the 
government observes the elimination of a nascent competitor, it must 
prove decisively that, absent the conduct, the competitor would have 
seized market share from the incumbent.  
This approach is misguided because even a modest probability of 
a highly detrimental outcome is a large loss, in expected value terms, and 
ought to be avoided.41 Hobbling enforcement in this manner would also 
produce a perverse incentive on the incumbent’s part, as the Microsoft 
court recognized, “to take more and earlier anticompetitive action.” 42 
Finally, restricting enforcement would fly in the face of antitrust doctrine, 
 
39  Cf. Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: 
Catching the Wave, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 43, 44 (concluding that “well-
managed, established companies . . . are rarely in the forefront of commercializing new 
technologies that don’t initially meet the needs of mainstream customers”). 
40 See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris & Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, First Principles for 
Review of Long-Consummated Mergers, 5 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 29, 30 (2020) 
(taking this view); Jonathan Jacobson & Christopher Mufarrige, Acquisitions of 
“Nascent” Competitors, ANTITRUST SOURCE (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 26) 
(advocating a “50.01%+” standard in evaluating acquisitions of nascent competitors). 
41 See, e.g., FURMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 13, 99–101 (advocating a “balance of 
harms” approach that condemns mergers resulting in harm in expected value terms, and 
criticizing a more-likely-than-not test as “unduly cautious”); Giulio Federico et al., 
Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and Protecting Disruption, in 20 INNOVATION AND 
THE ECONOMY 125, 142–43 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2019) (making a similar 
point); Doni Bloomfield, Getting to “May Be”: Probability, Potential Competition, and 
the Clayton Act 36–47 (working paper 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589820 
(advocating an expected value approach to horizontal mergers); see also Aaron Edlin et 
al., Activating Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16, 16 (interpreting Actavis to 
implement an expected consumer harm approach in the evaluation of certain horizontal 
agreements). 
42 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per 
curiam). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3624058
   
 
14 
discussed in the next Part, that recognizes liability even if the competitive 
but-for world is highly uncertain or otherwise incompletely specified.43 
However, our approach does not apply to any competitive threat, 
no matter how remote. We would confine enforcement to conduct that 
targets serious threats to the incumbent—in particular, those threats that 
are reasonably capable of significantly contributing to displacement of the 
incumbent. For example, hiring a talented engineer who might 
conceivably go on to build a giant killer doesn’t count; the threat is not far 
enough along.  
Monopoly power. Our proposed approach applies to monopolists 
and oligopolists alike. That said, when the threatened incumbent has 
monopoly power, concerns about lost competition are heightened in two 
respects.44 First, an incumbent with monopoly power has a heightened 
incentive to suppress an entrant, given that it internalizes most or all of the 
benefits from doing so.45 Relatedly, the threat places a great deal of value 
at risk. For the same acquisition price, as the value at risk rises, the 
threshold probability of threat needed to motivate costly anticompetitive 
conduct falls. Thus, as the size of the acquirer’s threatened profits 
increases, the threshold probability goes down. Put another way, we would 
expect the biggest firms to chase down the smallest threats. 
Second, such incumbents have a greater capacity to resist and 
suppress competition. Its advantages may include superior information 
about the threat posed and relationships with suppliers and customers that 
it can recruit or coerce into joining its scheme. Meanwhile, the public 
benefits of preserving a firm’s chance to compete for the market may be 
unusually great, particularly in markets where there are few or no other 
candidates available to challenge the incumbent for the market in the near 
 
43 See infra Part II.C (discussing case law under Section 2 of the Sherman Act that 
follows this approach); see also FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 157 (2013) 
(concluding that a reduction in the likelihood—the “risk”—of competition due to certain 
conduct is a “consequence [that] constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm,” even if 
the likelihood is low). 
44  See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at § 2.1.5 (noting 
heightened concern when “one of the merging firms has a strong incumbency position 
and the other merging firm threatens to disrupt market conditions with a new technology 
or business model”). 
45 Cf. id. at § 5.3 (“The lessening of competition resulting from such a merger is 
more likely to be substantial, the larger is the market share of the incumbent . . . .”). 
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term,46 and in markets whose characteristics make competition within the 
market difficult.47  
Acquisitions. Our approach applies equally to exclusionary 
conduct and the acquisition of a nascent competitor. Unlike exclusion, the 
acquisition target welcomes the attention, but that is hardly a guarantee of 
public benefit. So-called “killer acquisitions” are a real-world problem.48 
So are deals that leave the acquired product on the market while removing 
it as a threat to the existing firm. 
It might be argued that acquisitions are different because 
acquisition is an important means of exit for investors.49 If acquisitions 
were unduly curbed, pre-acquisition investments in risky startups might 
dry up, resulting in lost innovation. Moreover, synergies might be lost, as 
incumbents steered clear of buying and incubating promising new 
technologies. 
These concerns merit attention, but they are not powerful critiques 
of our proposed approach. Our approach is very far from a ban on the 
acquisition of small firms or even a ban on acquisitions by dominant firms. 
First, most deals involve complementary or otherwise noncompetitive 
technology. Such deals—deals without expectation that the acquired firm 
poses a serious threat of becoming a rival—are not targeted by our 
approach.  
Second, most promising firms that threaten a major incumbent 
have multiple suitors. Our suggestion is that, at most, the firm or firms 
most threatened by the nascent competitor should not be allowed to buy 
out the threat. For most firms, that approach would block acquisition by 
(at most) one suitor. Thus, investors can expect a payout even if payment 
by the threatened incumbent is blocked. And so, for example, if Google 
 
46 Cf. id. (“The lessening of competition resulting from such a merger is more likely 
to be substantial, . . . the greater is the competitive threat posed by this potential entrant 
relative to others.”). 
47 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 
714, 741 (2018) (“As a general principle, the greater and more durable is the market 
power of an incumbent firm, the larger is the payoff from preventing that firm from 
acquiring the smaller firms that, if left to grow on their own, would become its strongest 
challengers.”); Federico et al., supra note 41, at 152, 160 (favoring a more assertive 
approach under these circumstances). 
48 Colleen Cunningham et al., Killer Acquisitions (Apr. 22, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3241707 [https://perma.cc/MY4R-H9PR]. 
49 See Lemley & McCreary, supra note 36 (examining this phenomenon); D. Daniel 
Sokol, Vertical Mergers and Entrepreneurial Exit, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1357 (2018) 
(discussing the motivations for exit). 
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had bought WhatsApp after Facebook’s bid was blocked, investors would 
still see a substantial return with less competitive concern.50 These limits 
greatly reduce concerns about overenforcement that might otherwise chill 
desirable behavior.51 Such concerns are further reduced if care is taken to 
avoid false positives, an issue we return to in Part III. 
To be sure, limiting anticompetitive acquisitions will sometimes 
eliminate the highest bidder, and to that extent reduces the returns from 
investing in the startup in the first place. However, startups are not an end 
in themselves. Investments are desirable to the extent that the public 
actually sees some benefit from the innovation and competition they 
provide. Lowered investment in startups that fail to provide these benefits, 
because they end up in the hands of an incumbent, is a feature of antitrust 
enforcement rather than a bug.  
Finally, while removing a suitor may lower the acquisition price in 
some instances, all else equal, allowing anticompetitive deals is likely to 
have this effect too, and for a larger set of acquisitions. That is because 
allowing anticompetitive deals reduces the set of future acquirers. The 
resulting reduction in bidders for future startups with complementary 
technology can be expected to reduce the purchase price.52 
B. Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
Existing antitrust law implements our recommended approach to 
varying degrees. Section 7 of the Clayton Act applies to acquisitions, 
prohibiting deals whose effect “may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”53 Section 7 is the standard 
antitrust tool for drawing the line between dangerous and benign mergers.  
In some nascent competition cases, a well-crafted Section 7 
complaint can provide an effective enforcement tool. For example, when 
 
50 See Complaint, CDK Global, Inc., No. 9382 (F.T.C. Mar. 26, 2018), https://www. 
ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/docket_no_9382_cdk_automate_part_3_complain
t_redacted_public_version_0.pdf (FTC challenge to acquisition of a nascent challenger 
to CDK’s position in a market for car dealership software; incumbent bought nascent 
rival on fears it would otherwise be acquired by a wealthy outsider). 
51 Any chilling effect is further diminished if enforcement is confined to acquisitions 
by dominant firms. For further discussion, see infra Part II.C. 
52 Cf. Bryan & Hovenkamp, supra note 36, at 13-14 (arguing that bargaining power 
falls as incumbents exit due to startups shifting their efforts toward technologies that 
disproportionately benefit the market leader). 
53 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
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a nascent competitor already competes with the incumbent, an enforcer 
may make use of the presumption of illegality that applies to horizontal 
mergers that significantly increase concentration. 54 In some cases, the 
nascent competitor has already begun to compete directly in the 
incumbent’s market. 55  In others, the challenger may have begun to 
compete in adjacent but related businesses, such as attention or data. An 
example is Instagram, the photo sharing app acquired by Facebook in 
2012. At the time of acquisition, Instagram did not yet compete with 
Facebook for advertising but did compete for attention.56 
By contrast, where the nascent competitor offers solely future 
competition, matters are more complex. Some acquisitions have been 
challenged under the so-called potential competition doctrine, an aspect of 
horizontal merger doctrine that focuses upon certain forms of anticipated 
competition from the acquired firm.57 To fix ideas, suppose one bank 
serves customers in Seattle and another bank serves customers in 
Spokane. 58  The Seattle firm has the interest and ability to enter and 
compete in the geographically adjacent Spokane market. A merger would 
eliminate this competitive constraint. 
The potential competition doctrine is directed against two distinct 
forms of competitive constraint.59 The first version is that potential entry 
constrains present pricing. For example, if the Spokane bank recognizes 
the potential entry, should it decide to raise prices, that prospect tends to 
 
54 See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963); HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at § 5.3. 
55 See, e.g., Illumina Complaint, supra note 13. 
56 See Tim Wu, Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 
771, 774–76 (2019). 
57 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at § 1 (noting application 
to “actual or potential competitors”); see also id. § 2 (“The Agencies consider whether 
the merging firms have been, or likely will become absent the merger, substantial head-
to-head competitors.”). 
58 This scenario is drawn from United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 
602 (1974). 
59 See generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, NON-HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.1 (1984), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1175141/ 
download [https://perma.cc/2ZJL-Y3B8]. These guidelines are currently under revision 
as of June 2020. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, DOJ and FTC Announce Draft Vertical 
Merger Guidelines for Comment, (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/doj-
and-ftc-announce-draft-vertical-merger-guidelines-public-comment [https://perma.cc/ 
QB7R-PY4Z]. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3624058
   
 
18 
constrain its prices. 60  A merger is unlawful because it removes this 
constraint. This version goes by the unfortunate name of “perceived 
potential competition.” It is a present constraint on the firm’s conduct, and 
hence quite different from the future competition that is the focus of 
nascent competition. 
The second version, called “actual potential competition” (APC), 
focuses on the future competitive benefits that would result if the Seattle 
bank actually entered the Spokane market. As interpreted by lower courts, 
such mergers are actionable only where “the competitor ‘probably’ would 
have entered the market [and] its entry would have had pro-competitive 
effects.”61 
Under this interpretation of the law, the acquisition of a nascent 
competitor would be nearly impossible to challenge, given the difficulty 
in establishing the but-for world with sufficient precision and certainty. 
Thus, if this approach were the exclusive avenue for challenging 
acquisitions of nascent competitors, effective enforcement would be 
impossible. 
This unappetizing outcome, however, is not inevitable. First, it is 
not inevitable that the acquisition of a nascent competitor must be litigated 
as an APC case. APC case law has developed in a different context and 
with a different focus, and hence is distinguishable. One difference is that 
APC case law has substantially focused on the well-established acquirer 
as the potential entrant.62 In this context, the absence of a well-defined 
 
60 Cf. United States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 658 (1964) (noting that 
acquisition target was already “a substantial factor” in acquirer’s home market at the time 
of acquisition). 
61 FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 966 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (quoting FTC’s 
view of its burden); see also id. at 978 (accepting this view). The exact language varies. 
See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Co., 657 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1981) (“probably”); Tenneco, 
Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 1982) (“would likely”); Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. 
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 638 F.2d 1255, 1268–69 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(requiring a “reasonable probability” of entry, and construing that test to require more 
than “probability,” with “probability” requiring a greater than 50 percent chance). 
62 See, e.g., Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (considering acquirer bank as 
potential competitor in target’s geographic market); United States v. Falstaff Brewing 
Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973) (considering acquirer brewery as potential competitor in 
target’s geographic market); Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
826 F.2d 1235, 1254 (Becker, J., dissenting) (“The actual potential competition doctrine 
concerns the elimination of a company which would otherwise have entered the 
market . . . .”); see also Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1382 (1965) (focusing upon “the loss of the 
acquiring firm as an independent new competitor”). 
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plan to enter might be quite informative. By contrast, in nascent 
competition cases, it is the target, a newcomer, that offers future 
competition. Here, the absence of clear evidence of future entry is less 
informative. 
A second difference is that APC case law has ignored innovation. 
Its focus is anticipated entry using existing products, by firms with 
established capabilities already selling in related markets (often other 
geographic markets). 63 For example, the court would ask whether the 
existing bank is likely to expand its scope, as to a product that it already 
sells, to a new geographic market.64 
By contrast, as we have emphasized, nascent competition is 
important precisely because of its innovative potential. The appropriate 
analytic focus is the nature and potential of the unproven competitor’s 
product, rather than anticipated competition in existing products from an 
established firm. APC case law has not addressed or wrestled with the 
distinctive features of innovation competition, including its unusually 
important benefits, the prospect of competition for the market, the 
distinctive nature of the uncertainties associated with innovation 
competition, and the heightened importance of protecting innovative 
entrants when the incumbent resisting innovative displacement is a 
monopoly. This neglect is a significant limitation that limits its 
applicability. 
Relatedly, future innovation often creates uncertainty that the 
existing potential competition case law is not well equipped to handle. 
APC cases often rely on the fact that the entrant’s capabilities are fully 
established.65 The consequences of entry may be easy to assess given 
previous entry episodes by the same firm or analogous entry by others. For 
 
63  See JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A 
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 151–52 (2019) (concluding that potential competition case law 
“address[es] the loss through merger of anticipated rivalry in current products, not the 
loss of rivalry in innovation or future products”). 
64 See, e.g., Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (considering whether a Seattle 
bank would expand into Spokane); Falstaff, 410 U.S. 526 (considering whether a regional 
beer producer would expand into New England); El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 
(considering whether an Oregon natural gas supplier would compete in California); 
Yamaha Motor Co., 657 F.2d 971 (considering whether a Japanese outboard motor 
producer would expand into the United States); Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d 962 (considering 
whether provider of x-ray sterilization services in Europe would expand into the United 
States). 
65 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS 
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1121b (4th ed.) (emphasizing the 
potential competitor’s “requisite economic capabilities for substantial de novo entry”). 
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future innovation, these bases for prediction are generally absent, and the 
nature of the resulting uncertainty is generally more resistant to 
measurement. In the language used above, nascent competition is 
characterized by the Knightian uncertainty of an unproven technology or 
an emerging ecosystem that may evolve in unexpected directions. 
These differences suggest that APC case law should be 
distinguished in favor of a distinctive doctrinal approach centered on 
nascent competition. Alternatively, the requirements of APC case law 
should be relaxed to take account of the distinctive features of nascent 
competition where it is present.66 
Second, it is not inevitable that APC plaintiffs must satisfy such a 
demanding standard of proof. Section 7 prohibits acquisitions whose result 
merely “may be” anticompetitive harm. The demanding standard 
fashioned by courts in APC cases is subject to revision, particularly where, 
as here, a more forgiving test would be welfare improving.67 
Finally, Section 7 is not the only tool for challenging 
anticompetitive acquisitions of nascent competitors. As discussed next, 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (where it applies) is an effective 
enforcement tool in challenging certain anticompetitive acquisitions. 
C. Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
Section 2 prohibits “monopoliz[ation],” 68  and applies to 
exclusionary conduct and acquisitions undertaken by defendants with 
monopoly power to maintain that power. Section 2 case law implements 
 
66 To be clear, we are not arguing that such cases asserting lost future innovation are 
necessarily impossible to litigate as APC cases under existing law. And indeed, enforcers 
have used the APC frame to challenge mergers with a significant innovation component. 
See, e.g., Complaint at 6, Amgen Inc., No. C-4053 (F.T.C. July 12, 2002) (alleging 
reduced innovation competition and reduced potential competition as to certain products 
under development); Complaint at 9, Ciba-Geigy Ltd., No. C-3725 (F.T.C. Mar. 24, 
1997) (similar). 
67 See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412 (2015) (describing the “less-
than-usual force” of stare decisis in antitrust cases and the reasons for its weakness). For 
proposals to alter the existing rules, see Mark Glick & Catherine Ruetschlin, Big Tech 
Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrine: The Case of Facebook 6–7 (Inst. 
For New Econ. Thinking Working Paper No. 104, Oct. 2019); Bloomfield, supra note 
41, at 57–62 (advocating a presumption of illegality for certain acquisitions of potential 
competitors); John Kwoka, Non-Incumbent Competition: Mergers Involving 
Constraining and Prospective Competitors, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 173 (2001) (urging 
focus on a firm’s technological capability to become a competitor). 
68 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
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our proposed approach to causation. A government enforcer must show 
that the anticompetitive conduct was reasonably capable of contributing 
significantly to the maintenance of market power. This point bears 
emphasis: the government need not establish that absent the deal, 
successful entry was more likely than not to occur.69 
An important illustration is the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Microsoft. 
There the court reviewed a district court determination of liability for 
unlawful maintenance of monopoly. A central fact in the litigation, 
discussed previously, was that the competitive threat posed by Netscape 
was not fully fledged. Netscape made browsers, not operating systems. It 
had not developed into a real competitor to Windows and might never 
have done so. That fact, however, was not an insuperable barrier to 
antitrust enforcement. As the court explained, “[n]othing in § 2 . . . limits 
its prohibition to actions taken against threats that are already well-
developed enough to serve as present substitutes.”70 
The court adopted a rule of reason-like approach to the assessment 
of anticompetitive conduct that culminated in a balancing of 
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. Two types of anticompetitive 
conduct satisfy the court’s test: conduct that lacks any procompetitive 
justification, and conduct that is anticompetitive on balance, taking into 
account a partly offsetting procompetitive justification.71 Balancing is not 
some minor feature of the court’s approach to Section 2, but an important 
part of its enduring influence.72 Applying this approach, the court held that 
twelve acts were anticompetitive and lacked any procompetitive 
justification. The court conducted balancing as to several other aspects of 
Microsoft’s conduct, and determined that they were not unlawful.73 
 
69 See C. Scott Hemphill, Disruptive Incumbents: Platform Competition in an Age of 
Machine Learning, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1984–87 (2019) (discussing the use of 
Section 2 to challenge the elimination of nascent competition). 
70 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per 
curiam). 
71 Id. at 59. 
72 See, e.g., Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at 
Hearing on Section 2 of the Sherman Act: The Consumer Reigns: Using Section 2 to 
Ensure a “Competitive Kingdom” (June 20, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/atr/deborah-
platt-majoras-remarks#23 (defending Microsoft’s “weighted balancing” approach). 
73 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 63 (concluding, as to a ban on user interfaces that replaced 
the Windows desktop, that a cognizable justification—preventing the “drastic alteration 
of Microsoft’s copyrighted work”—“outweighs the marginal anticompetitive effect.”); 
id. at 67 (concluding, as to product design overriding the user choice of default browser, 
that Microsoft’s justification should be credited, and that DOJ had failed to show that the 
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Later in its opinion, the court gave separate consideration to 
causation. The court noted the absence of any finding that Netscape would 
have “developed into [a] serious enough cross-platform threat” to erode 
Microsoft’s marker power.74 Microsoft had argued that DOJ never proved 
that, absent the challenged conduct, more competition would have 
resulted. The court rejected this argument as setting too high a bar, holding 
that only a “rather edentulous” causation test applied.75  
This “toothless” test requires merely that the “exclusion of nascent 
threats is the type of conduct that is reasonably capable of contributing 
significantly” to monopoly maintenance, and that the targets of exclusion 
“reasonably constituted nascent threats.”76 On the same page, the court 
offered, as a virtually identical formulation, that causation may be inferred 
from conduct that “reasonably appear[s] capable of making a significant 
contribution to . . . maintaining monopoly power.”77 
This understanding of Microsoft’s causation holding is widely 
accepted.78 Courts and enforcers have followed the D.C. Circuit’s lead.79 
The scope of this holding is subject to debate. But at a minimum, it applies 
to conduct targeting a nascent competitor in order to maintain a monopoly, 
 
anticompetitive effect outweighed this justification); see also New York v. Microsoft 
Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 144 (D.D.C. 2002) (treating the D.C. Circuit’s analysis of 
incompatible Java as conduct where the procompetitive effect was “found to outweigh” 
the anticompetitive effect). 
74 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65). 
78 See, e.g., 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
§ 2C (8th ed. 2017) (stating that Microsoft “held that courts can infer causation from the 
fact that a defendant has engaged in anticompetitive conduct that ‘reasonably appear[s] 
capable of making a significant contribution to . . . maintaining monopoly power’”). 
79 See, e.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 833 (11th Cir. 2015) (“To prevail, 
the FTC must establish that McWane has engaged in anti-competitive conduct that 
reasonably appears to be a significant contribution to maintaining monopoly power.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 
187 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Unlawful maintenance of a monopoly is demonstrated by proof that 
a defendant has engaged in anti-competitive conduct that reasonably appears to be a 
significant contribution to maintaining monopoly power.”); FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 
F. Supp. 3d 658, 697 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[T]he Court may infer causation where a 
defendant has maintained monopoly power and the defendant's anticompetitive conduct 
‘reasonably appears capable’ of maintaining monopoly power.”); Illumina Complaint, 
supra note 13, at 12 (“The Acquisition is anticompetitive conduct reasonably capable of 
contributing significantly to Illumina’s maintenance of monopoly power.”). As these 
examples suggest, some courts use a slightly different verbal formulation—that the 
conduct reasonably appears to make a significant contribution. 
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challenged as a violation of § 2 in an equitable government enforcement 
action.80 
To be clear, Microsoft’s causation holding applies only to liability, 
not remedy. 81  A government enforcer may establish liability without 
proving that the conduct actually made a real difference in maintaining 
monopoly power. The court expressly and repeatedly contrasted this 
showing to the higher showing would be needed to support a remedy such 
as divestiture.82 
Critics have denied that Microsoft’s causation holding applies to 
acquisitions of nascent competitors, but their arguments are not 
persuasive. First, critics argue that Microsoft causation applies “by its 
terms” only where the defendant’s conduct lacks any procompetitive 
justification.83 Even if correct, Microsoft causation would still apply to a 
deal that lacked such a justification, such as a transaction that lacked a 
merger-specific, verifiable efficiency. The textual basis for the critics’ 
contention is the phrase “undesirable conduct” in this sentence of the 
court’s opinion: “To some degree, ‘the defendant is made to suffer the 
uncertain consequences of its own undesirable conduct.’”84 The idea is 
that “undesirable conduct” is limited to conduct “bereft of any 
procompetitive rationale.”85  
However, the Microsoft opinion is not so confined. By referring 
broadly to “undesirable conduct,” the court did not rule out conduct that 
 
80 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79 (articulating rule for “§ 2 liability in an equitable 
enforcement action” (emphasis omitted)). 
81  Id. (limiting attention to “§ 2 liability in an equitable enforcement action” 
(emphasis in original)). 
82 Id. at 80 (requiring a stronger causal connection at the remedy stage to provide 
“some measure of confidence that there has been an actual loss to competition that needs 
to be restored”); id. at 106 (insisting on “sufficient causal connection,” not yet 
established, between conduct and maintenance of monopoly). 
83 Muris & Nuechterlein, supra note 40, at 39 (arguing that Microsoft causation 
“applies by its terms only to exclusionary conduct lacking any procompetitive 
justification—and thus not to typical mergers, particularly those that were reviewed by 
the government itself before consummation”); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Koren W. Wong-
Ervin, Challenging Consummated Mergers Under Section 2, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 
(forthcoming May 2020) (manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3590703 (arguing 
that Microsoft causation “applies by its terms only to exclusionary conduct lacking any 
procompetitive justification—and, therefore, not to the typical merger, particularly if it 
was reviewed and approved by the Department of Justice (‘DoJ’) or the FTC itself before 
consummation”). 
84 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79 (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65). 
85 Muris & Nuechterlein, supra note 40, at 40. 
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was undesirable on balance. The causation analysis and holding are 
framed generally, rather than narrowly limited.86 To be sure, the court did 
not actually condemn any conduct after balancing. However, each type of 
conduct was evaluated within a balancing framework that clearly 
contemplated the identification of anticompetitive conduct with partly 
offsetting procompetitive aspects.87 Narrowing the scope of Microsoft to 
omit conduct that is anticompetitive on balance would abandon an 
important aspect of the case’s enduring influence. 
Second, critics argue that the analysis is controlled by a later D.C. 
Circuit case.88 In Rambus Inc. v. FTC, the court rejected an FTC challenge 
to deceptive conduct in the standard setting process, concluding that the 
FTC had “failed to demonstrate that Rambus’s conduct was 
exclusionary.”89 However, the Rambus court was addressing a different 
form of monopolizing conduct—monopoly acquisition, rather than 
maintenance90—and a different question: whether the conduct actually 
excluded a rival, as opposed to (as in Microsoft) whether such exclusion 
had a competitive consequence.91 These differences make it particularly 
unlikely that the panel opinion in Rambus silently overruled Microsoft’s 
en banc holding on causation. 
Finally, critics seek to weaponize the fact that Section 7 was 
crafted as a plaintiff-friendly enforcement tool. If Section 7 has a lower 
bar than Section 2, and yet Section 7 requires a clear demonstrated harm 
to competition, the argument goes, then the Section 2 hurdle must be 
equally high. The problem here, as discussed in the previous section, is 
that judicial interpretations of Section 7 are too demanding. There is no 
 
86 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79. Nor does the quoted source, the Areeda/Hovenkamp 
treatise, use the phrase “undesirable conduct” in the narrow fashion urged by critics. 
87 See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
88 See, e.g., Ginsburg & Wong-Ervin, supra note 83, at 2 (“In Rambus v. FTC —a 
Section 2 case the D.C. Circuit decided after Microsoft—the court held that the agency 
failed to prove that ‘but-for’ the defendant’s conduct, there would have been harm to the 
competitive process.”). 
89 Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
90 See Avishalom Tor, Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions of Dominance or 
Monopoly Power, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 847, 848–49 (2010) (discussing heightened false 
positive concerns in monopoly acquisition cases); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 65, at ¶ 803a (concluding that “evidence of causation is particularly critical” 
in monopoly acquisition cases). 
91 See Ankur Kapoor, What Is the Standard of Causation of Monopoly?, ANTITRUST, 
Summer 2009, at 38, 40 (making this point). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3624058
   
 
25 
good reason to extend this error to Section 2. This argument is also flatly 
contrary to Microsoft’s causation holding. 
The typical monopolization case, illustrated by Microsoft, focuses 
on exclusionary conduct. However, Section 2 also reaches acquisitions.92 
One famous example of monopolization through acquisition was the 
consolidation of market power by Standard Oil.93 If Microsoft had sought 
to acquire Netscape simply in order to eliminate a competitive threat, that 
deal would violate Section 2.94 Such an acquisition would be unlawful, 
just like analogous exclusionary conduct, even though future competition 
from Netscape was an uncertain and merely probabilistic prospect. 
Otherwise we would face the absurd result that a firm with monopoly 
power could freely acquire rather than exclude its nascent rivals. 
The Section 2 approach is limited to incumbents with monopoly 
power. This is precisely the subset of cases in which, as we explain above, 
vigorous protection of nascent competition is particularly important.95 
 
92 See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, at ¶ 912b (concluding that the 
acquisition of a nascent rival “tends to maintain a monopoly by cutting off an avenue of 
future competition before it has had a chance to develop” and thereby violates Section 
2). 
93 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 73–75 (1911) 
(agreeing with the court below that the 1899 consolidation of control in Standard Oil of 
New Jersey “operated to destroy the ‘potentiality of competition’ which otherwise would 
have existed”). The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that this 
conduct violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 72–77. 
94 In fact, at one point, Microsoft apparently approached Netscape about buying or 
licensing Netscape’s browser code. Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Findings of Fact ¶ 64.1, 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 98-1232), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/us-v-microsoft-proposed-findings-fact-1 (citing deposition 
testimony of a Microsoft executive describing the 1994 overture, prior to Microsoft’s full 
recognition of the browser threat, to license Netscape browser software); id. at ¶ 64.2 
(quoting a Netscape executive’s testimony that Microsoft had “offered a flat fee of a 
couple of million dollars to take us out of the game[, which] would have killed our 
product in their space”). Microsoft later sought a market allocation arrangement in which 
Netscape would cease competing for PC-compatible browser business. Id. at ¶ 67 
(describing evidence of a June 1995 meeting in which Microsoft proposed that Netscape 
not develop a browser for Windows 95); see also Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 30–33 
(describing efforts to “[d]issuade Netscape from [d]eveloping Navigator as a 
[p]latform”); Email from Bill Gates to Paul Maritz (May 31, 1995, 1:17 PM), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/03/03/22.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/4EGL-PV99] (“I think there is a very powerful deal of some kind we can do with 
Netscape. . . . I would really like to see something like this happen!!”). Microsoft also 
discussed internally the possibility of investing in Netscape. Id. (“Of course over time we 
will compete on servers but we can help them a lot in the meantime. We could even pay 
them money as part of the deal buying some piece of them or something.”). 
95 See supra Part II.A. 
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Some observers wary of broad enforcement may regard this, if Section 7 
enforcement is largely unavailable, as a helpful limiting principle. 
A significant feature of Section 2 enforcement, beyond the relaxed 
approach to causation, is that it positions a court to collectively evaluate a 
larger set of acts. Section 7, by contrast, is directed to the scrutiny of a 
single acquisition. For example, to return to the Facebook example, the 
incumbent acquired other, lesser-known firms in addition to Instagram and 
WhatsApp. 96  The broad aperture of Section 2 matters because the 
cumulative effect of multiple acts is greater than a single act. Consider, as 
a hypothetical example, the dominant player who faces a series of ten 
nascent competitors, each of which has a 10% chance of displacing it. By 
acquiring them all, the incumbent eliminates a set of competitive forces 
that collectively had a strong chance of displacing the incumbent.97 In this 
example, liability may be found even if (contrary to our view) a more-
likely-than-not harm must be shown.98 
Under a Section 2 approach, the target need not participate in the 
market dominated by the incumbent. The same is true if a Section 2-type 
approach is pursued under Section 7. Section 7 is not limited to horizontal 
mergers; the statute prohibits transactions that “tend to create a 
monopoly,” 99 which includes acquisitions of a nascent competitor not 
currently in the same market as the acquirer. An enforcer is therefore free 
to sue under Section 7, arguing that the acquisition improperly tends to 
preserve the incumbent’s monopoly power. The presumption of illegality 
would not apply. Case law on this use of Section 7 is scant. The analysis 
would roughly track the Section 2 inquiry and center upon an evaluation 
of monopoly power and competitive effects. Without the benefit of a 
presumption, this approach strikes us as neither clearly better nor clearly 
worse than the Section 2 approach.100 
 
96 See, e.g., Why Facebook Shouldn’t Be Allowed to Buy tbh, STRATECHERY (Oct. 
23, 2017), https://stratechery.com/2017/why-facebook-shouldnt-be-allowed-to-buy-tbh. 
97  For example, if the probabilities of success by nascent competitors are 
independent, the collective probability that at least one would succeed is 1 – 0.910 = 65%. 
Cf. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949) 
(aggregating foreclosure effect of multiple firms). 
98 We thank Mark Lemley for suggesting this point. Cf. United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (describing without 
endorsing DOJ’s course-of-conduct theory of liability).  
99 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
100  Cf. Scott A. Sher, Closed but Not Forgotten: Government Review of 
Consummated Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
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III. Identifying Anticompetitive Acquisitions 
We now take a closer look at what an antitrust case premised on 
exclusion through acquisition might look like as a practical matter.  
When an incumbent acquires a nascent competitor, the 
government, to build a prima facie case, will be required to make some 
demonstration that the acquisition is anticompetitive. In that undertaking, 
several forms of evidence may be relevant, including the beginnings of 
direct competition (as in the Illumina/PacBio case101), or the existence of 
competition in markets adjacent to the incumbent’s primary market, which 
would be lost if the deal is permitted. 
Also relevant will be any evidence that suggests the motive for the 
acquisition or the intent behind it.102 In other words, as we discuss in 
greater detail in Section III.A, intent evidence may clarify whether the 
acquisition is anticompetitive, or as the Supreme Court has put it, “whether 
the challenged conduct is fairly characterized as ‘exclusionary’ [or] 
‘anticompetitive.’”103 Other forms of evidence typically used to build a 
prima facie case, such as evidence of higher prices, will not typically be 
available, given that a nascent competitor, by its nature, has not begun to 
fully compete at the time of acquisition. 
If the plaintiff presents evidence sufficient to build a prima facie 
case that the acquisition is anticompetitive, the parties will have the 
opportunity to offer a procompetitive justification for the transaction. 
Incumbents, of course, make acquisitions for many reasons, many of 
which are procompetitive or otherwise benign. For example, an incumbent 
might buy a small, unproven firm to acquire complementary technology 
or expertise or simply to make a bet on a moon shot. 104  Careful 
consideration of the asserted justification helps to limit enforcement to 
those acquisitions which are truly anticompetitive. In some cases, the 
available evidence will make clear that the claimed justification is merely 
pretextual. In others, the problem is much more challenging.  
 
41, 65 (2004) (arguing that Section 2 grants greater latitude to challenge acquisitions 
based on later market conditions). 
101 See Illumina Complaint, supra note 13. 
102 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).  
103 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985).  
104 Anticompetitive acquisitions may result in adding talent, so the fact that talent 
was acquired should not, by itself, offer immunity to scrutiny. 
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One particularly important justification is that the acquirer 
improves the targeted business in a fashion that would otherwise never 
occur (the “incubation” justification). However, credit for incubating a 
startup is subject to the caveat, common to all merger analysis, that the 
benefit must be a merger specific efficiency.105 Consider, for example, 
Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram.106 As noted above, at the time of the 
acquisition, Facebook apparently regarded the photo sharing app as a 
serious threat.107 Facebook has argued that the purpose of this acquisition 
was to incubate a promising company, not to cabin a future threat,108 and 
that Instagram only proved a success because of the care, attention, and 
engineering talent supplied by Facebook.109 
Facebook’s argument merits careful consideration. To make the 
case that its acquisition was a merger-specific efficiency, Facebook would 
need to present evidence that similar benefits could not have been 
achieved if Instagram had been allowed to grow on a standalone basis or 
in the hands of an alternative acquirer. 110 Such a case would need to 
contend with contrary evidence of the extensive advice and funding 
offered by independent venture capital investors and the alternative 
acquisition offer by Twitter. 111  Indeed, some alternative acquirers of 
Instagram and WhatsApp might have been well positioned to incubate a 
 
105 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at § 10 (“The Agencies credit 
only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely 
to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed merger or another means having 
comparable anticompetitive effects.”). 
106 User growth was dramatic, reaching 40 million users in just 18 months. Matt 
Burns, Instagram’s User Count Now at 40 Million, Saw 10 Million New Users in Last 10 
Days, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 13, 2012), https://techcrunch.com/2012/04/13/instagrams-
user-count-now-at-40-million-saw-10-million-new-users-in-last-10-days [https://perma. 
cc/6UNW-K29K]. 
107 See supra note 24. 
108 For an argument along these lines, see Jacobson & Mufarrige, supra note 40, at 
14–15. 
109 See The Aspen Inst., A Conversation with Mark Zuckerberg, YOUTUBE (June 26, 
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHk2WfL5Gs4 [https://perma.cc/P8SH-
437G]. 
110 [I]t is incumbent upon the merging firms to substantiate efficiency claims so that 
the Agencies can verify by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each 
asserted efficiency, how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing 
so), how each would enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, 
and why each would be merger-specific. 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at § 10. 
111  See Kara Swisher, The Money Shot, VANITY FAIR (May 6, 2013), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2013/06/kara-swisher-instagram [https:// 
perma.cc/2GDV-26UQ] (describing “attention from venture capitalists”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3624058
   
 
29 
new platform competitor rather than eliminate it—a development that 
ought to be particularly welcomed, even from firms such as Google with 
a strong position in adjacent businesses.112 
A. Evidence of an Anticompetitive Plan 
As this suggests, in the evaluation of the competitive effects, the 
difficult challenge is to distinguish an anticompetitive acquisition from a 
harmless or procompetitive deal. Given the uncertainties, and faced with 
a lack of clear economic evidence of effects, we suggest that strong 
evidence of anticompetitive intent is a fruitful way to draw the line.  
The relevant intent that we have in mind is that the incumbent 
sought to eliminate a competitive threat, and that the acquisition was 
designed to accomplish that goal. Intent evidence of this kind is useful as 
a way to shed light on the acquisition’s effects. It “help[s] the court to 
interpret facts and to predict consequences.”113 An enforcer should look 
for, and the court should weigh, such evidence in its various forms. 
Intent evidence in antitrust cases is frequently criticized,114 and we 
agree with some of the criticism. To be clear, we do not favor liability 
simply because an investigation uncovers a sales manager’s expressed 
wish “to destroy the competition.” Such evidence lacks probative value. 
What agencies and courts should be looking for, as always, is evidence of 
an anticompetitive plan, design, or program. 
The simplest form of intent evidence is documentary evidence of 
a specific concern with future threats, coupled with conduct that eliminates 
the threat. When the parties say something specific and detailed about their 
anticompetitive plan, we should believe them. A leading example is the 
 
112 See Hemphill, supra note 69, at 1993–97 (emphasizing the role of disruptive 
competition from incumbents in adjacent businesses). 
113 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(considering intent evidence “relevant only to the extent it helps us understand the likely 
effect”). 
114 See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, at ¶ 1506 (“Emphasizing 
purpose frequently masks a failure to analyze the conduct. The judge or jury seems more 
comfortable examining the defendant’s soul than analyzing his conduct and why antitrust 
policy calls for its prohibition or toleration.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopolization: 
Past, Present and Future, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 99, 102 (1992) (broadly criticizing the use 
of intent evidence while acknowledging its utility, in principle, to “distinguish acts and 
plans that will reduce rivals’ elasticity of supply from those . . . that increase market share 
by offering more goods at lower prices”). 
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Bill Gates Tidal Wave memo discussed above.115 Another is Facebook’s 
internal discussions about the acquisition of WhatsApp, which highlighted 
the threat, recognized by top Facebook leadership, from messaging apps 
that might well “morph” into “social networks and replace us.” 116 
 
Beyond such documentary evidence, an anticompetitive design 
might also be shown by conduct. For example, a firm’s broader pattern of 
acquiring nascent competitors sheds light on its intent in making each 
acquisition. Such evidence might be reinforced by proof of an internal 
program to identify rising competitors that matches up with the firm’s 
completed and attempted acquisitions. Facebook once again furnishes an 
example.117  
Economic evidence of sacrifice would buttress the proof of intent. 
For example, an overpayment to acquire the firm, compared to the 
benchmark offers of other would-be acquirers, may suggest an 
anticompetitive purpose,118 though consideration must be given to benign 
explanations for the premium, including an incumbent’s superior 
information about the standalone value of the firm. Moreover, a firm 
pursuing a defensive acquisition strategy may be willing to repeatedly 
overpay to acquire relative longshots in order to preserve its position, as 
opposed to developing the business. A track record of multiple 
acquisitions of nascent competitors that turned out in retrospect to be duds 
is a further indication of such sacrifice. 
However, sacrifice is not an essential identifying feature. The 
incumbent may not need to sacrifice profits in order to make an 
anticompetitive acquisition. The discussion above is indicative, rather than 
definitive. We do not attempt to enumerate all the types of evidence that 
might be relevant to an evaluation of intent. 
 
115 See supra Part I.A (discussing Microsoft’s Tidal Wave memo). 
116 See id. (discussing Facebook’s concerns). 
117 See Schechner & Olson, supra note 18 (describing such a program). 
118 See Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing 
the Gale of Creative Destruction, 9 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 485, 505 (2000) 
(discussing incumbent’s higher willingness to pay for an innovation in order to maintain 
monopoly market structure). For an example of overpayment as a form of sacrifice that 
provides evidence of anticompetitive effect, see generally FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 
136 (2013). 
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B. Later-Acquired Evidence 
Some enforcement actions to protect nascent competitors may take 
the form of challenges to consummated mergers. Enforcers have legal 
latitude to challenge such deals. 119  Antitrust law has a statute of 
limitations, but it does not apply to injunctive relief. 120  Moreover, 
laches—an unreasonable delay in bringing the suit—does not apply to the 
government.121 
Most legal adjudication is backward looking. In contrast, since the 
passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in 1976, most merger adjudication 
has been forward looking: decisions under the Clayton Act have been 
based on projections as to what the effects of a merger might be, not what 
they were.122 
Due to this forward-looking posture, the enforcement agency and 
the court, considering an acquisition of a nascent competitor before the 
fact, is in the unusual position where delay may be expected, in some 
respects, to increase the accuracy of decision. Facts that the regulator has 
trouble seeing today often become clearer later. There may be costs to 
waiting—notably, the difficulty and disruptiveness of after-the-fact 
divestiture, if that is the chosen remedy123—but they are not the usual 
accuracy costs expected in legal adjudication.124 
 
119 See Hemphill, supra note 69, at 1986–87. 
120 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2012) (establishing a four-year statute of limitations for suits 
seeking monetary damages); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, at ¶ 1205b (“[T]he 
four-year limitation applies only to damage suits, not to actions in equity.”). 
121 See Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 928 (9th 
Cir. 1975), overruled on other grounds, California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 
(1990) (“Laches cannot ordinarily be asserted against the sovereign.”); United States v. 
Pennsalt Chems. Corp., 262 F. Supp. 101, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (“Laches is no defense in 
a suit by the government to vindicate a public right.”); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 65, at ¶ 320g (describing this as the “usual proposition”). 
122 Hosp. Corp. of America v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir. 
1986) (Posner, J.) (“A predictive judgment, necessarily probabilistic and judgmental 
rather than demonstrable . . . is called for.”). 
123 See, e.g., Sher, supra note 100, at 81–82 (discussing practical difficulties of 
divestiture). 
124 Even in backward-looking adjudication, the usual expectation is that, all else 
being equal, the passage of time will lead to reduced accuracy. Witnesses disappear or 
forget things, documents are lost, and physical evidence decays. These are typical 
justifications for a statute of limitations. Of course, delays that are justified for fact-
finding, such as delays to allow discovery and trial, may increase accuracy, and there 
may be ways, specific to certain laws, that delay leads to greater accuracy. See, e.g., 
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The benefits of waiting are more pronounced where there is an 
initial asymmetry of information between the parties and the enforcer.125 
If an incumbent acts expeditiously to dispatch a nascent threat, that will 
occur at a point in time at which it is difficult to tell what is really going 
on. This problem is particularly evident in industries marked by rapid 
technological change. The incumbent, centered in its industry, and highly 
sophisticated, is likely to see any threat more clearly, and uniquely so. This 
asymmetry is exacerbated when the incumbent sits at the center of a larger 
platform ecosystem, and (relatedly) when it acts as a middleman, giving it 
a privileged view into developments on the edges.126  
The incumbent has an incentive to exploit its information 
advantage and acquire a nascent rival during a period when the enforcer 
has low confidence about the benefits of enforcement. However, this 
period of asymmetry is not necessarily permanent. Several types of 
evidence may emerge with the passage of time. 
Testimony and documentary evidence. New witnesses and 
documents may surface as employees exit the merged firm or leaks occur. 
This evidence might shed light on the acquirer’s true intent or its 
understanding of competitive effects, namely fears that the acquired firm 
posed a serious competitive threat. Such documentary and testimonial 
evidence might have been discoverable, in principle, during a pre-
acquisition investigation. However, in practice this evidence might be 
suppressed at first, given the parties’ strong incentive to leave enforcers in 
 
Douglas Lichtman, Patient Patents: Can Certain Types of Patent Litigation Be 
Beneficially Delayed?, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 429 (2017) (emphasizing the benefits of 
delay for accurate patent adjudication). 
125  Cf. Marco Ottaviani & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Policy Timing Under 
Uncertainty: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Merger Control (2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c28a/3c4483077369fda4db01adc7cad556f4ce53.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5JJC-HLG9] (noting the importance of private information held by 
parties). 
126  See, e.g., Betsy Morris & Deepa Seetharaman, The New Copycats: How 
Facebook Squashes Competition from Startups, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2017, 
1:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-copycats-how-facebook-squashes-
competition-from-startups-1502293444 [https://perma.cc/3ALL-M74C] (cataloging 
ways in which Facebook keeps careful track of potentially threatening startups); Lina 
Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 978 (2019) 
(emphasizing “technology that lets [Facebook] detect which rival apps are succeeding”). 
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the dark. Post-merger assessments of the competitive effects of the deal 
can be probative as well.127 
Pattern of acquisitions. Other evidence is available only after the 
fact. For example, a firm’s broader pattern of acquiring many nascent 
competitors sheds light on its intent, relative to what is apparent from a 
single transaction. An ongoing program of buying up any and all serious 
nascent threats to maintain dominance might not be clear to the world until 
much later.  
Actual effects of the acquisition. Waiting until after the deal has 
been completed also produces new objective evidence about the 
competitive effects of the deal. Most obviously, the post-transaction world 
produces data about what actually happened—for example, that prices 
increased or quality worsened. This is an obvious point as applied to a 
horizontal merger that actually raises prices; the price rise is no longer a 
prediction but an observed fact. 128  The same idea applies to 
anticompetitive harms arising from the acquisition of a nascent 
competitor. This point extends to efficiencies, whose likelihood and 
magnitude are difficult to assess ex ante.129 
To make use of post-transaction data in this way is not necessarily 
straightforward, because it entails a prediction about an unobserved state 
of the world, namely what would have happened in the but-for world 
where the deal was blocked. Moreover, in nascent competition cases, there 
is relatively little or no direct competition at the time of the transaction; 
thus, the effect may be difficult to detect using price or quality data. 
Indeed, even though the transaction is anticompetitive as compared to the 
 
127 See, e.g., Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., FTC Docket No. 9315, Opinion of the 
Commission (2007) (“[O]ur analysis is a retrospective inquiry based on empirical 
evidence and documents reflecting the parties’ post-merger assessments of the deal.”). 
128 Orley Ashenfelter et al., Did Robert Bork Underestimate the Competitive Impact 
of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers, 57 J.L. & ECON. S67 passim (2014); 
Nathan H. Miller & Matthew C. Weinberg, Understanding the Price Effects of the 
MillerCoors Joint Venture, 85 ECONOMETRICA 1763, 1763 (2017) (concluding that the 
MillerCoors joint venture increased prices); see also JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER 
CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY (2014) 
(collecting and assessing a large set of merger retrospectives). 
129  Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer 
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1048–49 (1987); Brian 
A. Facey, The Future of Looking Back: The Efficient Modeling of Subsequent Review, 44 
ANTITRUST BULL. 519, 524–25 (1999); Menesh S. Patel, Merger Breakups, WIS. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020–2021) (manuscript at 30), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3469984. 
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proper but-for world, one might well see no change in the observed world 
before versus after the transaction. 
Market conditions. It is sometimes hard to assess, at the time of 
acquisition, whether the incumbent’s market power will last. The 
importance of a particular barrier to entry may become clearer over time. 
For example, in the early 2000s, not everyone understood the longer-term 
significance of data, and that control of data might have significant 
competitive implications. Another way to say this is that in setting 
enforcement priorities, the expected cost of inaction changes. Ex ante, it 
may seem low. But enforcers may recognize later that failing to act is 
unexpectedly costly, given the seriousness of preexisting barriers. 
For example, when Facebook acquired WhatsApp in 2014, the 
durability of its dominance in social network services was not entirely 
clear. Many industry observers believed Facebook’s dominance was under 
threat, as then-new firms like Snapchat, Vine, Pinterest, and Yik Yak ate 
away at its user base.130 Only some of those firms survived, and they 
collectively failed to supplant Facebook as some believed they would.131 
This suggests that the barriers to successful entry were higher than it might 
have appeared. 
Conversely, the passage of time may also demonstrate the lack of 
durable market power. For example, when AOL merged with Time 
Warner in 2000, enforcers crafted a remedy premised on concerns about 
AOL’s power over the market for instant messaging.132 However, AOL’s 
position was ephemeral. Its hold over instant messaging was a function of 
its relative share of internet users, which declined due to increased 
competition from other internet service providers.133 
Furthermore, the general-purpose nature and disruptive 
importance of a particular technology may become clearer to everyone 
over time. For example, Microsoft predicted early on the long-term 
importance of the Internet and the browser; 134  the correctness of that 
prediction gradually became clear. Instagram was clearly onto something 
 
130 See Madrigal, supra note 17. 
131 See id. 
132 Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 
Authorizations by Time Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc. Transferors, to AOL Time 
Warner, Inc., Transferee, 16 F.C.C. Rcd. 6547, 6627 (2001). 
133 See WU, supra note 27, at 264–68 (describing the rise of competing internet 
service providers).  
134 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3624058
   
 
35 
by being “mobile first.” We know today that mobile was the future; at the 
time, this was suspected but impossible to know. 
To be clear, we are not arguing that liability exists if technological 
change, subsequent to the transaction, results in a convergence of markets 
that no one anticipated at the time. Such a development cuts off the causal 
link between the acquisition and subsequent poor market performance. 
But it might be, for example, that the incumbent, with a keen 
understanding of its own industry, understood well that a firm was highly 
likely to be a future competitor, in a manner not grasped by the enforcer. 
New economic learning. Finally, the passage of time may also 
furnish new economic evidence and new tools that are useful for 
evaluating the effects of a particular transaction. For example, one source 
of insight about competitive effects is the outcome of other closely related 
market contexts. For example, by looking at the average effects of other 
(permitted) transactions, we can form a prediction about the effects of this 
deal.135 New economic tools, much like improved DNA analysis of crime 
scene, might improve the accuracy of adjudication as well. These are 
benefits of waiting to bring a suit, as opposed to benefits of ex post review 
as such. 
*      *      * 
These are just examples of existing facts that might become clearer 
over time. It is true that each of these matters might be estimated or 
guessed at the time of acquisition or other forms of alleged exclusion. And, 
of course, waiting is sometimes the wrong call. By the time the regulator 
acts, it may be too late. 
That said, waiting can have an important benefit in reducing 
agency uncertainty about key facts. Over time, the fog may clear. Key 
facts known only to the incumbent may become common knowledge. And 
relying on the facts that emerge may, moreover, be helpful to a generalist 
judge, whose daily diet is backward-looking cases, and for whom the 
 
135 A leading example is the FTC’s retrospective analyses of hospital mergers. See 
Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at ABA Retrospective 
Analysis of Agency Determinations in Merger Transactions Symposium: Retrospectives 
at the FTC: Promoting an Antitrust Agenda 8 (June 28, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/retrospectives-ftc-
promoting-antitrust-agenda/130628aba-antitrust.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F9P-G7VA)] 
(discussing this work, begun in 2002, and its results). 
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complex economic projections relied on for merger cases may be 
mystifying. 
Ex post enforcement nevertheless troubles some observers, 
particularly when it takes the form of a challenge to a consummated 
transaction.136 This position is in tension with the view that a high degree 
of certainty is required in any merger challenge. If (contrary to our view) 
a high degree of certainty is required to challenge the acquisition of a 
nascent competitor, we should be more willing to wait, if necessary, for 
the level of confidence to increase. It might sometimes appear that a 
cautious approach is desirable; but if so, a corollary is that once the 
requisite facts are available to regulators, it is appropriate to act. Indeed, 
the virtues of a cautious approach ex ante are increased by retaining the 
option to act ex post; otherwise regulators are precipitated into acting even 
when doing so might be premature.137 
Conclusion 
The acquisition or exclusion of unproven innovators is properly 
regarded as a core concern of antitrust law. Evidence of anticompetitive 
intent—particularly evidence of a larger anticompetitive design that spans 
multiple acts—can help to resolve the difficult question of distinguishing 
salutary from anticompetitive acquisitions.  
Enforcement agencies must be ready to intervene ex post when a 
pattern of anticompetitive conduct becomes clearer. As we have 
explained, ex post enforcement is sometimes inevitable and has some 
desirable features. The distinctive setting of nascent competition tends to 
lend support to later evaluation and to longstanding remedial proposals, 
 
136  See, e.g., Muris & Nuechterlein, supra note 40 (proposing a high bar for 
challenges to consummated transactions). 
137 A subtle issue arises with ex post enforcement against certain exceptional deals 
that are beneficial overall in ex ante expected value terms but anticompetitive ex post. 
See Marco Ottaviani & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Ex Ante or Ex Post Competition Policy? 
A Progress Report, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 356, 357–58 (2011) (identifying this issue). 
For example, suppose that the deal confers upon consumers a merger-specific benefit of 
50 together with a harm of 20, and that the harmful effect is also the source of profits 
motivating the deal. Such a deal might be permitted given the net benefit of 30. If the 
harm is probabilistic—a 20% chance of a harm of 100, let’s say—the deal is still 
beneficial in expected value terms. Evaluated on a purely ex post basis, however, it might 
be found unlawful in those instances where the anticompetitive effect is realized. The 
result is a false positive, judged from the standpoint of encouraging ex ante beneficial 
deals. We expect such outcomes to be rare, but if they arise, merging parties should be 
free to defend their deal on the ground that they are the exceptional case. 
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such as conditional clearance that effectively place a merger on parole, 
that incorporate ex post scrutiny.138 
Our analysis highlights a gap in the enforcement agencies’ 
guidance directed toward horizontal and nonhorizontal mergers. Neither 
set of guidelines distinctively addresses nascent competitors in the sense 
described in this article.139 The absence of separate attention to nascent 
competition steers enforcers too strongly toward an assessment of 
standard horizontal issues, including limited accommodation of future 
competition under the banner of potential competition, when nascent 
competition requires a distinct analysis. An expansion of the guidelines 
may therefore be warranted to account for acquisitions that eliminate a 
nascent, innovative threat. 
 
 
138 Advocates of ex post review include Joseph F. Brodley, supra note 129, at 1049 
(“The conclusion seems inescapable that if an efficiencies defense is to be recognized in 
antitrust law, the efficiency claim must be subject to ex post review.”); Robert Pitofsky, 
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address to the ABA Antitrust Section: Subsequent 
Review: A Slightly Different Approach to Antitrust Enforcement (Aug. 7, 1995) (“The 
advantages of this approach are obvious. The parties are allowed to complete the 
transaction, and achieve claimed efficiencies, and the Commission has an opportunity to 
observe whether anticompetitive effects actually emerge.”); see also Steven C. Salop, 
Modifying Merger Consent Decrees to Improve Merger Enforcement Policy, ANTITRUST, 
Fall 2016, at 15, 15 (advocating “more frequent reviews of consummated mergers that 
have been cleared without challenge, particularly those that were close calls”). 
139 Potential competition, by contrast, is discussed in the Guidelines. See supra notes 
57–59 and accompanying text. 
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